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5. Civil Society and Democratization in Asia: 
Prospects and challenges in the new millennium 
 
Emma Porio1 
    
 
Introduction 
Political events in Asia during the last fifteen years have shown that civil society is 
crucial in understanding the changes in economy and polity. These events have given rise 
to several interpretations of the concept and role of civil society in society and the 
democratization of political life. In turn, civil society movements (CSMs) have utilized 
different political and cultural schemes to advance their claims for democratic space and 
share of societal resources. Emerging from the various nation-states in the region, these 
cultural schemas are shaped by their different political-economic contexts and level of 
integration to the global systems of capital and information and communication 
technology. 
 
Major social and economic transformations during the past decade have led to the decline 
among authoritarian governments and the resurgence of democratic institutions and 
systems of governance in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Throughout the Asia-
Pacific region, the respective roles of the state, market system, and civil society are being 
reexamined (ESCAP 1998). In the forefront of this reexamination are developmental 
NGOs and CBOs, who are challenging the traditional ways that the state and the market 
have allocated societal resources. Several political and economic developments have led 
to this re-evaluation, such as the deterioration and collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern 
Europe, the increasing integration of centralized economies like China and Vietnam to 
open capitalist economies, the fiscal crisis, and the effects of structural adjustment. The 
breaking down of the Berlin Wall in 1989, symbolically ended the Cold War politics 
among the superpowers and heralded the search for an alternative development paradigm 
(Porio 1997). Assertions regarding the relationship between democracy and economic 
development became fashionable. Civil society, then, became an exciting prospect for this 
agenda. 
  
The resurgence of democratic regimes has been mostly ushered by the emergence of 
vibrant civil society groups and movements. This is clearly demonstrated in the statistics 
provided by the Freedom House in New York. Their data show that the number of free or 
liberal democratic states have risen from 42 in 1972 to 56 in 1985 to 76 in 1985 -- or from 
29 percent in 1972 to 33.5 percent in 1985 to 39.8 percent in 1995 (cited in Bello 2000). 
The third wave of democratization as described by Huntington (1991), then, seem to have 
been nurtured by civil society. 
  
The twin phenomenon of civil society and increasing democratization has captured the 
imagination of intellectuals, activists, political leaders, and development assistance 
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agencies and generated many conferences, meetings, and publications. It has also fueled 
the advocacy for political and economic reforms. More importantly, it has spawned an 
alternative model of development assistance: the channeling of official development 
assistance and delivery of social services through non-government organizations (NGOs), 
community-based organizations (CBOs), and private foundations. Civil society groups 
have become alternative service delivery routes for assistance or entry points for political 
intervention because of the failure of existing state agencies and institutions (Brandon 
1999). Global statistics on foreign assistance attest to the centrality of NGOs in social 
development. In 1975, the proportion of total aid from OECD countries delivered through 
NGOs was less than one percent. In 1993, this has increased to about five percent, 
excluding those from UN agencies and multilateral institutions (Riddell and Robinson 
1995; Silliman and Garner Noble 1998). Largely, this is due to the perception that NGOs 
have more accountable and transparent structures and processes compared to state 
bureaucracies. 
 
This paper examines the conceptual foundations of civil society and its role in shaping 
socio-political life in the past decade as well as their prospects and challenges for the next 
millennium. It argues that civil society is a key mediating force in changing the state-
society dynamics, which in turn, is also being reconfigured by the globalization of social 
life and the rise of identity and resource claims from various groups. Furthermore, state-
civil society engagements have been influenced by communication technologies, 
facilitating the efficient movement of information, capital, and human resources across 
groups and national boundaries. Finally, the growth of civil society must always be seen 
within the context of the Asian states trying to balance its functions of promoting political 
legitimacy and economic development.  
 
First I will review the conceptual foundations and interpretations of the term civil society. 
Then I explore the different roles that civil society has played in the democratization of 
socio-political life in some parts of the region. The coverage of this paper is mostly 
limited to Southeast Asia. Finally it is concluded that civil society is a major factor in 
reconfiguring the global-local nexus of state-market-civil society relations, which in turn, 
define its challenges in the new millennium.  
 
 
The conceptual bases of civil society 
Civil society has a long intellectual and political history (Seligman 1992). Several authors 
(e.g. Laothamatas 1996; Gellner 1991; He 1997; Kumar 1993; Rodan 1995; Tadashi 
1996, to name a few) have extensively discussed the issues regarding the emergence and 
role of civil society in several historical and political contexts. To provide a conceptual 
frame for this paper, I will just briefly cite a few key interpretations of civil society.  
 
Concept of civil society. Caroll (2000) defines civil society as ‘people coming together 
around a common concern, a concern which is linked to the values of the wider society, 
and insisting that the major institutions--the state, political parties, and business take these 
values into consideration.’ Diamond (1994: 5) gives a more extensive definition:   
 
Civil society is…the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-
generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a 
legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from ‘society’ in general in that it 
involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, 
 
 
passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands 
on the state, and hold state officials accountable. Civil society is an intermediary 
entity, standing between the private sphere and the state. 
 
According to Diamond (1994), civil society is alive and well when citizens participate in 
church groups, professional associations, women's groups, trade unions, human rights 
groups, and civic associations in order to press for state and economic reforms. It 
encompasses a vast array of formal and informal organizations engaged in a wide range 
of activities to achieve economic, cultural, educational, and developmental goals. 
Pluralism and diversity characterize the groups comprising civil society. It is not 
synonymous with society and beyond being ‘voluntary, self-generating, autonomous, and 
rule-abiding,’ the organizations of civil society are distinct from other social groups in 
several respects. It is concerned with public rather than private ends and relates to the 
state not to gain formal power but rather ‘to seek from the state concessions, benefits, 
policy changes, relief, redress, or accountability’ (Diamond 1994: 7).  In short, civil 
society is the politically active sector of society. Autonomous both from the state and 
from political parties, civil society encompasses masses of citizens engaged in public 
protest, social movements, and NGOs acting in the public sphere. Civil society excludes 
the household, profit-making enterprises, political parties, and groups striving to gain 
control of the state through armed rebellion (Silliman and Garner Noble 1998: 13). 
 
Civil society is the realm of collective, public action between the private sphere and the 
state, which Serrano (1993) calls the ‘politically active popular sector’ of society. 
Meanwhile, Kumar (1993: 383) understands civil society as ‘the space between the 
family and the state, or between the individual and the state; in the non-state institutions 
which organize and educate citizens for political participation.’ Antonio Gramsci (1977) 
views civil society as one of the key elements comprising his three-part framework of the 
state, economy, and civil society. It is the primary locus for creating ideology, a key 
element in building consensus and legitimizing power. Thus, hegemony of a particular 
group, whether cultural or social, is built on consent rather than coercion. Habermas 
(1989) conceptualizes it as the ‘the realm which constitutes the intersection between state 
and society.’ Huang (1993), deriving inspiration from Habermas, conceptualizes it as the 
third sphere. He is also skeptical of the development of societal organizations in societies 
long dominated by party-state politics.  
 
Civil society, in general, is the political space between the state and society. In particular, 
it is the space occupied and created by the non-profit sector between the state and the 
market. Often, the non-profit sector is dominated by NGOs in alliance with grassroots 
organizations or CBOs. Social movements constitute an important subset of civil society.   
 
Rocamora et al. (1998) also added that the growth of civil societies has to be understood 
at four inter-related levels: state, political society, civil society and international actors. 
They also argue that democratic movements have to be always calibrated within the post- 
Cold War politics. For a better appreciation of the relationship among these entities, see 























According to Rodan (1995:21), civil society is just one form of political space where 
opposition parties can articulate and negotiate their interests. Currently, the space of civil 
society enjoys wide support both in the North and South and from the elite to 
marginalized groups. Indeed, the discourse of civil society is quite seductive! But there is 
a need to demystify this situation and be more realistic about the power and potential of 
civil society in democratizing state and political power.  
 
Because of their visibility and popularity, NGOs are almost taken as the equivalent of 
civil society. But civil society is best conceptualized as a political space created by 
NGOs, CBOs, professional groups, and other voluntary associations allied with broad-
based movements (e.g., women's, indigenous people's, environment). The composition of 
civil society is quite dependent on the political and economic context of the society and 
nation-state. In the same manner, so are the relationship, strategies, and skills of CSOs 
and networks in their engagements with the state. 
 
The Empowered Civil Society. The previous section described the characteristics and 
organizational bases of civil society. But when does civil society become mobilized and 
visible to take on larger political issues? Or what are the conditions that push CSOs to 
take issues into a broader public arena and organize street protests, demonstrations, and 
other mobilization activities challenging state action/inaction?  The following section will 
attempt to describe the conditions, the evolving strategies and impacts on the state, 
society and within civil society groups, and their capacity to create and consolidate the 
democratic process. 
  
Several conditions transform CSOs into broad movements to challenge the state on its 
decisions and actions. Civil society groups go beyond their organizational concerns to 
work towards broader networks and coalitions when the following conditions are present. 
There is freedom to organize and exchange information and a shared perception that the 
traditional institutions of society like the state can no longer be relied upon to protect the 
rights of the citizens. Being able to obtain the wide support of the media and other 
institutions like the church, CSOs generate a widespread indignation against the 
perpetrators of the violation of basic rights of the citizens, giving rise to a broad base 
social movement.    
 
Historical evidence in the region has shown that vibrancy of civil society is generated by 
economic growth and the expansion of the middle class, as in the case of East Asian 
















been critical in restoring democracy in formerly authoritarian regimes like the Philippines 
and Indonesia.  
 
The attraction of civil society movements lies in its promise of social inclusion among 
marginalized groups to political and economic systems traditionally dominated by few 
elites (Silliman and Garner Noble 1998: 10). More significantly, the tactics and strategies 
of civil society anchored on peaceful (i.e. reformist) mechanisms appeal to a broad 
spectrum of society. In this manner, then, CSOs/CSMs provide greater attraction and 
support compared to progressive groups aligned with the Left. The popularity of civil 
society based movements in contemporary politics, to a certain extent, account for the 
decline of Left-inspired movements. 
 
Civil society: Asian or western?  Several writers (Muzaffar 1996; Serrano 1994) have 
argued that civil society is rooted in western rational tradition and political culture 
anchored on the notion of state and citizenship. Serrano, however, also argued that the 
values and practices associated with communal institutions in Asia find resonance in civil 
society:  
 
Voluntary action is deeply rooted in Asian communities. It is directed toward 
common concerns that cannot be adequately addressed by individual families and 
extended kinship support systems: production, exchange, rituals from birth to 
death, and collective security, all of which maintain community consensus and 
cohesion. The most common form of organization is the self-help and mutual-
exchange group. In Indonesia, the gotong royong or mutual help is equivalent to 
bayanihan in the Philippines. Funeral associations, of which there are thousands 
in Thailand, are also mutual-benefit associations in Thailand. (Serrano1994: 272).  
 
The tradition of voluntary associations in Asia has been rooted in the need to fulfill basic 
social security needs that are beyond the capacity of individual, family or clan. Thus, the 
priority of civil society organizations is to secure the autonomy of people's organizations 
so that their basic needs can be addressed. But this situation also reflects the relative 
inability of the central or local state to respond to the needs of its citizenry.  
 
Contemporary CSMs have their bases in voluntary associations, groups, and networks at 
the community level. But they have succeeded in connecting their local struggles for 
social security to the need for reforms in the larger political and economic structures. 
They have realized that broader structural changes are necessary in addressing the welfare 
needs of the people, especially the marginalized and disadvantaged groups. The 
traditional and cultural bases of CSMs have been largely transformed by the growing 
realization among civil society groups that the structural distribution of societal resources 
and the quality of life of individuals and communities are largely mediated by broader 
state policies and programs. This can be seen in their evolving strategies that seem to 
indicate the increasing political sophistication of CSOs. 
 
The argument that civil society is an alien concept in Asia is quite interesting because 
Serrano's earlier characterization of voluntary associations strongly resembles the 
associational life described by Tocqueville in America a hundred years ago. Serrano's 
point, however, heightens an important principle: in understanding state-civil society 
dynamics, one must always recognize the different social, political, economic, and 
 
 
cultural contexts that shape the character of civil society and the movements associated 
with it. 
 
Another issue popularly articulated before the Asian crisis was that Asian values are not 
quite compatible with the western-based notions of liberal democracy. Alagappa (1995) 
noted that elites in a number of countries in the region—China, Vietnam, Burma, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and Laos—support economic development but 
reject democracy. Several Asian leaders, notably Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, have argued 
that many of the institutions and practices associated with western democratic states 
cannot be applied to Asia at this point in time (Muzzafar 1996). 
 
Thus, acceptance or at most tolerance for voluntary associations and institutions that 
attempt to effect policies and programs of the state is not high. Some political leaders 
have attempted to justify authoritarian regimes by asserting that democratic institutions, 
like civil society, are not compatible with Asian cultures and values. But Korea's Kim 
Dae Jung has rejected this idea and argued that democracy has a place in Asian tradition. 
Moreover, Serrano and Muzaffar stress that many of these democratic values have been 
articulated by various religions and cultures found in Asia.   But Alagappa noted that this 
retreat for cover under Asian values is really a resistance to the ‘reactionary imperialism’ 
of the West upon Asia.  
 
Prior to the Asian crisis, Fukuyama (1995) deriving inspiration from the experiences of 
Singapore and Malaysia among others, asserted that the only competitor to liberal 
democracy is Asian paternalistic authoritarianism. However, the downfall of Soeharto in 
Indonesia in the hands of civil society may have eroded the strength of this argument.  
Meanwhile, Gellner (1991: 507) underscores the difficulty of generating a civil society 
capable of supporting a liberal democracy in communist and Muslim societies. 
Indonesians, however, in the wake of protests during the Asian crisis argue that in 
traditional Muslim societies, there is no clear separation between the state and civil 
society. Indonesian NGO leaders maintain that the civil society, masyarakat madani, is 
part of the Indonesian Muslim tradition. In the post-Soeharto period, civil society seem to 
have assumed a critical role in the assumption of the Wahid administration. It would be 
interesting to see what would be the role of civil society under Megawati's administration. 
 
But declining political legitimacy has forced some regimes in the region to accommodate 
the increasing tide of CSMs. The states' accommodation to civil society is strongly linked 
to its need for political legitimacy. Moreover, the states' commitment to economic growth 
and modernization has pushed them to give their reluctant support to the ideas and 
practices of civil society groups. In China, for instance, the development of professional 
associations and other civil society groups especially in urban areas, is seen as part of a 
modernizing society. In the same manner, NGO efforts at strengthening the rule of law is 
seen as part of restructuring institutions in support of China's increasing integration to the 
capitalist system. 
 
In Burma, meanwhile, the State Law and Order Council (SLORC) is an attempt by the 
military junta to gain political legitimacy. Thus, the opposition under Aung San Kyi is 
tolerated to a certain extent while the state attempts to liberalize the economy and find a 
more formal political role for the military. In Indonesia, citizens endured the state's 
intolerance for civil society groups because of its promise of political stability and 
economic development. In the late 1990s, however, professional associations, 
 
 
intellectuals, human rights associations, Islamic organizations, Christian minorities and 
segments of the armed forces, began challenging top-level corruption and excesses of 
power. These civil society groups have become a major voice for economic and political 
reforms. 
 
The expansion and growth of Asian economies have created discernible changes in the 
lifestyle of its population. In China, for example, higher disposable income and greater 
access to outside information have allowed an expanding middle class more educational, 
training, and travel opportunities. In the same manner, the number of voluntary 
associations with professional, charitable, relief and educational goals has increased. 
Although subject to government regulation, these associations are allowed to define their 
own agendas. Progress in economic and political reforms has expanded the space for civil 
society groups in socio-political life. Thus, economic development and the expansion of a 
middle class faciltate the rise of CSOs and democratization.  
 
In Korea, the NGOs were crucial in the political mobilization in the late 1980s (Silliman 
and Garner Noble 1998: 9). In 1986, Vietnam adopted doi moi or political and economic 
renovation; critics, however, have noted that economic benefits are not equally shared. 




Civil society, democracy, and the state 
The aim of civil society is not to transform the state but to democratize society (Atienza 
1994).  In contemporary politics, the most visible, articulate, and influential among the 
CSOs are the NGOs. They are the agents for consolidating and maintaining democracy 
rather than initiating it. The associational life of civil society serves as a training ground 
for democracy as participation in it sharpens political skills and increases the efficacy of 
citizens. Voluntary associations develop democratic attitudes and values as well as form 
and preserve civic culture that support democracy. Participation in associational life 
increases tolerance and willingness to compromise and appreciation for the rights and 
obligations of a democratic citizen (Diamond 1994, cited by Silliman and Garner Noble 
1998). This can be seen in the political and advocacy activities of NGOs to facilitate 
political participation and redress the inequalities of society. Furthermore, NGO 
networks, coalitions, and groups constituting civil society institutionalize the values and 
ethos of civil culture necessary for a stable democracy (Dawisha and Parrot 1994:125). 
Deriving inspiration from Huntington (1984), Diamond further argues that the functions 
of civil society include providing a countercheck to potential excesses of a democratic 
state and to democratize authoritarian states. 
 
Silliman and Garner Noble (1998:18-19) credit civil society with the following 
achievements: 1) it creates a vibrant public discourse; 2) it redefines the content of 
politics, and 3) it increases institutionalization of democratic processes. Although the 
authors are describing civil society in the Philippines, I would argue that these 
achievements are applicable, albeit in varying degrees, to civil society in other countries 
in the region. 
 
Civil society has redefined and broadened the content of politics. To a large extent, it has 
been responsible for the inclusion of issues previously viewed as not amenable to political 
action like domestic violence, rights of indigenous peoples to ancestral lands, community 
 
 
rights to natural resources. It also exerted pressure for the institution of democratic 
processes like free elections and the promotion of human rights. 
 
In the era of worldwide pressure for democratization, state leaders have allowed political 
space for civil society. A classic example is documented by the excellent study of 
Baogang He (1997) on the democratic implications of civil society in China. Describing 
the existence of semi-civil society or quasi-civil society in China, he asserts that these 
groups serve dual functions, namely: 1) as channel for state control, and 2) as new tool or 
source of legitimation. His dual-function thesis provides us with an excellent guide in 
understanding the place of civil society in countries like China, Vietnam and Cambodia. 
The presence of NGO leaders in the political administration of Wahid has strengthened 
the emerging civilian character of the Indonesian state. In the process, it has aided the 
Indonesian state in constructing its political legitimacy. In Vietnam, there is a different 
pattern of state-civil society relationship in the South as compared to the North; the South 
seems to provide a more supportive context in the development of CSOs. The presence of 
NGOs and their increasing role in the delivery of social services have been, to a certain 
extent, calibrated to increase the legitimacy of the central state based in Hanoi.    
 
The socio-political activities of CSOs during the past two decades have contributed to 
their growing capacity to engage the state. Over time, CSOs and networks have grown in 
terms of skills, specialization, and their capacities to assist marginalized groups. Niyom 
(1997), in observing the growth of NGOs focused on urban poor alleviation in Bangkok, 
noted their growing specialization and interdependence. This allowed them a greater 
sphere of influence over their partner-CBOs, as well as lesser dependence on state-funded 
programs. But while the NGO community shares the core values of autonomy, pluralism, 
diversity, closeness to the grassroots, a bottom-up perspective, and volunteerism, there is 
a healthy disagreement over strategy and the precise role of citizen organizations. This is 
especially true in societies with vibrant CSMs like that of  Philippines and Thailand.  
 
Some authors like Karaos (1994) and Atienza (1994) have argued that power in civil 
society has a moral force. Other authors (e.g. Bullard 2000) have also asserted that this 
space is not benign or neutral because it is the arena where conflicting class interests are 
contested. Short of direct domination and coercion, the state and the market must gain the 
consent of civil society for their legitimacy. For whoever captures civil society captures 
all! 
   
Some authors (e.g. Diamond 1994; Coronel Ferrer 1997) are unabashedly euphoric about 
the rise of civil society in the restoration of democratic processes and institutions. Others 
like Rodan (1995), however, take a more balanced view. Reminiscent of the Gramscian 
tradition, these authors assert that civil society always has to be viewed within the 
struggle for power between state and societal institutions and stakeholders. 
Contemporary analysts of civil society have derived their inspiration primarily from the 
political theories of Locke and Tocqueville or from Hegel, Marx, and Gramsci. Those 
who are inspired by the first group of theorists, (e.g. Diamond, 1994, 1998) celebrate the 
democratic role of CSOs/CSMs and credit these groups for consolidating/stabilizing the 
democratic processes and institutions. Their ideas are strongly articulated in the 
developmental policies and programs promoted by UN agencies, bilateral, and 
multilateral institutions in third world and non-Western countries. But those who are 
inspired by the latter group of critical theorists are not as impressed with the momentary 





Civil society, democratization, and the middle class   
The emergence of civil society has been strongly associated with the expansion of the 
middle-class in Latin America (O' Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1988) and other 
parts of the globe (e.g. Laothamatas 1998). As earlier argued, the prominence of civil 
society discourse in contemporary politics is a function of modernization and economic 
growth, the expansion of the middle class, and the state's accommodation of the new 
forces as way of strengthening its legitimacy. The emergence of new classes redefines the 
issues and the character of the opposition. A new economic system, meanwhile, gives rise 
to new sources of wealth, and class interest gives rise to new fractures in new socio-
political issues. Compared to the 1970s, when state opposition came mostly from 
peasants, workers, and student movements, civil society has transformed political 
opposition in the 1980s and 1990s to include segments of the upper, middle, and working 
classes (Rodan 1996).  
 
The rise of the middle class has been a crucial factor in broad-based mobilizations that 
often centered on demands on the state to institute economic and political reforms. Surin 
Maisrikrod (1998), in examining political movements in Thailand, argues that the middle 
class was crucial in installing democratic regimes rather than in consolidating it. He 
further argues that democratic stability is always a compromise between the state and the 
capitalist class, on one hand, and the inclusion of the middle class in the political process, 
on the other. This is understandable considering the constitution of civil society in 
Thailand --a loose coalition of intellectuals, professionals, NGOs, CBOs, workers and 
peasant organizations. In Taiwan, as well as in other parts of Asia, the middle, business, 
and the working classes have been credited for the increasing democratization of state 
politics.  
 
Exploring the relationship between industrialization and the growth of middle classes in 
East and Southeast Asia, Rodan (1996: xi) argues that efforts ‘to establish greater space 
for political parties, and civil societies that feed into these organizations are only part of 
the attempts to extend avenues for contesting state power.’  He questions the assertion of 
some writers that the expansion of civil society is closely linked with the advance of 
liberal democracy. The rise of civil society, then, is a particular form of accommodation 
by the state to contending social forces. Thus, it is an effort by political regimes to 
reconstitute and consolidate state power for greater legitimacy before its constituency and 
the international political order.   
 
 
State-civil society relations: engagements and evolving strategies 
The skills and strategies utilized by CSOs in relating to the state are in part dependent on 
the stage of social mobilization and political transitions. In the Philippines, Wui and 
Lopez (1997: 1) observed the marked shift among civil society groups -- from that of 
opposition and confrontation during the Marcos regime to that of negotiating and creating 
alternatives during the Aquino and Ramos administrations. Likewise, in Indonesia, during 
the struggle against the authoritarian regime of Soeharto, there was a relative unity among 
CSOs and networks vis-à-vis the state. In these political shifts (from Soeharto to Habibie 
and then to the Wahid administration), civil society groups were divided in their strategies 
of confrontation and negotiation. Thus, in different stages of the democratic transition, 
 
 
CSOs assume different roles and utilize different strategies in their relationship to the 
state. 
  
The rise of civil society in Asia and its political impact is relative to the location in the 
configuration of political and economic power within a particular nation-state. This was 
clearly illustrated in the fight against the Marcos dictatorship and the ascendance of civil 
society in the Philippines' 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution. The Left, a key force in 
the political opposition against the Marcos regime, lost its traditional sphere of influence 
because it refused to participate in the 1987 snap elections called by Marcos and in the 
call for people support by the Church during the critical days of the EDSA Revolution. 
The same pattern can be seen in the subsequent role of civil society and other opposition 
groups in the Aquino, Ramos, Estrada, and Macapagal-Arroyo administrations.   
 
The contentious strategies for engaging the state has often caused fragmentation among 
CSOs and networks. For example, debates over the role of NGOs in political elections 
have occupied the energies of CSOs, often distracting them from more fundamental needs 
of their clientele groups. In the same manner, their lack of consensus regarding the 
leadership and tactics have created political cleavages within the CSOs (Serrano 1994). 
 
The character of civil society's engagement with the state and the market has to be viewed 
historically according to the phase of the democratic movement. Nothing illustrates this 
better than the recruitment of NGO leaders to government positions. When NGOs are 
recruited to the business of policy-making and program implementation, their strategies 
that worked so well during the phase of critical engagement with the state are rendered 
ineffective during this phase of strategic collaboration. The particular relationship of civil 
society groups and their leaders was clearly seen during the Aquino administration in the 
Philippines and in the Wahid administration in Indonesia. The overwhelming unity of 
civil society groups is quite impressive against a common enemy like an oppressive state 
(e.g. against the Marcos dictatorship or the authoritarian regime of Soeharto). But once 
this common enemy is dislodged, the fragility of their alliances is unmasked. 
 
 Understanding the dynamics of civil society involves two essential elements: 1) the 
plurality of groups that make up civil society and recognizing their class dimensions, and 
2) fractions of the elite/dominant groups and their tendency to appropriate certain groups 
in civil society to gain legitimacy and suppress those who will challenge them. 
Recognizing these elements allow us to see more clearly the limits and potentials of 
CSOs' pluralism and heterogeneity. While diversity is a great strength among CSOs and 
networks, it is also their main weakness. Often, this creates the divisions within civil 
society, which make them susceptible to the political maneuvers of the dominant groups. 
This becomes more meaningful in the context of neo-liberal globalization that produces 
both gainers and losers depending on the structural location of stakeholders. It is during 
these crucial times that class interests, which tend to be masked by civil society, come to 
the surface and increase the potential for divisiveness. 
 
The Asian crisis has set the stage for the intensification of the above conditions and the 
political fragmentation among CSOs.  The previous years of sustained economic growth 
have led to the growth of the middle class and the democratization process, and facilitated 
the forging of collaborative partnerships and linkages between CSOs and the state in 
implementing developmental programs. The crisis, however, brought back the 
confrontational strategies of CSOs in the earlier period. Capital flight, closing of 
 
 
factories, and retrenchment of workers brought protests and strikes back into the forefront 
of state-civil society relations. This calls attention to the danger of being mesmerized by 
the contingent successes of CSOs and CSMs. 
 
   
Globalization, state, and civil society  
State-civil society relations are being redefined by the globalization of economy, social 
movements and the information technology. Both at national and local levels, the impacts 
of these broad forces are also being reconfigured by socio-political movements  
advocating for greater political space as well as a larger share of societal resources. More 
than ever, the non-profit sector or civil society, is faced with a formidable task to mediate 
between the state and the market whose political and economic agenda often run counter 
to the values of equity and justice. 
 
The social effects of globalization have intensified civil society engagement with the 
state. The growing economic integration and interdependence among nation-states 
threaten political and cultural sovereignty. In addition, information technology allows 
data and capital to move around the globe at the speed of light. Initial research findings 
show that the newfound freedom and efficiency from these technological changes seem to 
exacerbate existing structural inequalities. 
 
Another factor that has shaped civil society engagements is the globalization of social 
movements (e.g. environment, and children, women's and indigenous people's rights). 
Partly, these have been brought about by the development agenda of UN agencies and 
other multilateral institutions like the World Bank which have spawned the development 
of global social movements (GSMs). These bodies have accorded NGOs political 
recognition and have broadly supported their activities. Aided by the techno-economic 
revolution and by these multilateral institutions, GSMs have transnationalized civil 
society engagements. While this new trend provides support and strength to local and 
national mobilizations, it has also generated conflicts and tensions from within and 
without. Civil society groups also create a new kind of elitism and exclusion among them 
vis-a-vis the state. 
 
For example, the efforts towards economic integration in the region through the WTO and 
AFTA provisions have spawned a lot of criticisms from civil society as witnessed in the 
Seattle (Fall 1999) and the Bangkok (February 2000) meetings. These political 
mobilizations have further complicated the deleterious effects of the Asian crisis.  
  
Given these prevailing conditions, the demand for state reforms, participation of civil 
society, and good governance have become part of the political idioms that inform much 
of the identity and resource claims in the postmodern age.  
 
 
Civil society in the new millennium: tensions and challenges 
Caroll (2000) enumerates the challenges and tensions of civil society which emanate from 
its diversity and pluralism, and from its engagement with the state and the market. These 
tensions revolve around the following issues: 1) the building of consensus on values 
among civil society groups with its pluralism and internal heterogeneity (i.e., therefore no 
monopoly of ‘correct’ values); 2) the interfacing or critical engagment with the global 
economy, the political society, the state; and 3) creating social institutions aimed at 
 
 
enlarging the space for public articulation and debate of issues and values.  Other major 
challenges of civil society include poverty and inequity, good governance, globalization, 
and strengthening NGO/social development practitioner roles and capabilities (Racelis, 
2000).  
 
In responding to the above challenges, CSOs have to reconcile with forces that can aid or 
complicate their strategies for political and economic reforms such as the social/political 
security issues, decentralization of state powers, and the digital revolution in information 
technology. At the heart of the challenge is how to reconcile the values associated with 
civil society (e.g. justice, compassion, economic freedom) with the values that inform the 
market and state bureaucracy (rationality, efficiency, profit). Economic and technological 
forces behind globalization seem to further widen the political and economic gap between 
those who are positiviely integrated to the global system and those who are not. 
  
Civil society engagements with the state in the new millinneum are therefore fraught with 
tensions and challenges generated by the globalization of capital and information 
technology, devolution of state powers to local systems of governance, and the rise of 
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